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ABSTRACT
Thispaper investigates the effcct.s of imperfectly cre(lil)ktradeliberalization programs on
welfare and the allocation of real resources. We present a ratiotmi expectations model in
whicha government, with limited access to niternatioiial financial iiiarkets may be forced
to abort a liberalization program if hard-currency reserves are depleted too quickly. The
liberalization's lack of perfect credibility arts as a (listortiohl which becomes(rationally)
intensified under the typical first-best policy of a (brect move to free trade. A gradual
lowering of trade barriers turns out to he welfare-superior to au inuniediate liberalization,
and to improve the chance that. the program will ultimately succeed. We then derive
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Given the unpopularity of tariffs among economiists, it should come as no surprise that so
many countries have been counselled to eml)ark upon allll)itiolls tra(lc lil)erali7,ation programs over
the past decade. In return for large reductions in trade barriers, conveiitional neo-classical models
and newer niodels using an intertemporal approach to commimercjal policy offer the prospect of
improvements in welfare and efficiency. To the extent that these imiodels are realistic, they make a
strong case for the vial)ility and profital)ility of immediate ami cc)lllplete tra(le liberalization.
In an uncertain world, however, there is less cause for 01)tilnisllI than many such models would
suggest. Recent attempts at trade liberalizatioii iii the southern coiie )f Latin America, like many
earlier programs in these and other countries, have been ('ollapletely or (as in the case of Chile)
partially abandoned. Argentina and Uruguay, for example, had plaiis to establish a lower, more
uniform tariff structure with a maximum rate of 35 percent (down from several hundred percent)
and a niinimuin rate of about 10 percent. The Argentiniaii package, aiinoiinced iii December 1078,
was abandoned in 1981 and the progress that had been made was soon reversed. The Urugiiayan
plan never succeeded in i'educing trade barriers. Chile was by far the most successful in bringing
down tariffs, which reached a uniforimi level of 10 percent (excluding autos) by the end of 1079.
Since then, however, tariffs have been raise(l substantially.
With this kind of experience as the nile, it seems our models should address the possibility that
agents will take the government's stated intention of permaiiently libcraliziiig trade with a (rational)
grain of salt. Several authors have in fact argued that recent trade lil)erahization programs in the
southern cone were not fully credible. Edwards (1084, 1085). Pastore (1082), Sjaasted (1083), and
Dornbusch (1984), for example, all point toward blataiit domestic policy inconsistencies as being
1J)art.ly res1)onsihlc for the programs' failures.1 Notwithstanding this colisensus, however, there has
beenlittle attempt to investigate the inechaiiisms by which a lack of credibility actually makes
failure more likely.
This paper represents a iitore formal attempt to inject the issue of im)erfcctly credible gov—
ernnient policy into the discussion of tariff reduction.Weiiivestigate the intertemporal incentives
in consumption and the distortions in output which are gellerate(l by fears that the liberalization
program will be short lived. In addition, we try to rank ex)licitly coitiinercial policy alternatives
by their effects on welfare, the allocation of real resources, and the level of cre(hil)ility. The anal-
ysis intentionally focuses on countries (such as iiiany LDCs today) which have limited access to
international financial markets, in the sense that unanticipated current. account deficits iiiust be
financed by reserve depletion instead of by borrowing. The cre(lil)ility of trade reform is perhaps
most important in these countries because of their dual histories of policy reversals and severe trade
restrictions.
Our interest lies not just in how (Ioubt.s about the p('r1I11e11ce of trade reforms contribute
to the eventual reinstatement of trade l)aI'riers. We also consider the effects of alternative, slower
speeds of liberalization on the equilibrium level of credibility. Even though such slower rates of
reform are second—best in that they represent clear deviations from the neoclassical optimum, they
arc desirable here because they turn out to lessen the dist.ortioii gciierated l)y the lack of perfect
credibility. Indeed, it turns out that in the niodel below, governuients with credibility problems
should not pursue policies that eliminate tariffs right, away. Such a findiiig is particularly surprising
in the context of our optimizing two-period fraiiiework, which tends to l)ias the results toward
complete and instantaneous liberalization even as compared with more stali(lard macro-economic
treatnieiits.2 In the modern intertemporal approach, for example, a 1)'1J1ia1i('I1t tariff reduction is
painless in the sense that it does miot result in a tra(le deficit. Once tariffs are zero, there is no
mtertemporal incentive to deviate from the neoclassical optiiinimii of balance(l tra(le.3
The simple two—period model below treats a country winch has i'ecently removed its trade
Dornhnsch (1984), in particular alludes to theint.ertomporalefforts geuieratel lv oxlu.rtat.jouls of higher future tariffs.
2 Examples of theapproachiaso-l in this paper include Dixit aunt Norniaui (lost)). Sveiiscoui and 11 aziui (1983), Il azili aud
Svensson (1983), Edwards and van Wijnhergen (1983), and van Wijuhergen (1084).
3As van Wijnhergen (1983) points out, tariff reductions in LDC's may 1mphaIsolut.e decline in the return to capital,
sluice umports in those countries are often relatively capital iuit.eusivo. In the iiiterteuruiorat ai,i>roacli. removing tariffs once and
for all crniltl then reduce investment, leading to an m.provernentinthe current arcoiuuit.
2restrictions, so that tariffs are zero in the first period. Ifagents l)elieve that the government
may be forced to abandon the liberalization in period two,consluners are iiicliiiecl to substitute
consumption toward the first period and producers willon average divert more resources toward
the inefficient import sector. These twosources of additional spending lead to a current account
deficit, which in turn will make the governmentmore susceptible to external shocks that deplete
reserves. A higher percentage of the time, the authorities will lw forcedto levy tariffs in an effort to
cut imports, thereby generating badly neededhard-currency reserves. In this way, agents' disbelief
that the policy will endure becomesself-fulfilling.
After describing the model in section 1, section 2goes on to derive a rational expectations
equilibrium in which the current accoimt deficit, level ofwelfare, and the probability of collapse
are endogenous. Next, we consider a more gradual liberalizationprogram which employs I)oSitive
first-period tariffs.It is possible to show that gradualismimproves welfare, lowers the current
account deficit, and raises the probability that free trade willultimately prevail. There is a unique,
positive first-period tariff which is welfare optimal.
For iiiany developing countries today,particiilaiIy those with large external (lebts, l)iflding
restrictions on international borrowing and thescarcity of hard-currency reserves fix current ac-
counts more or less exogenously. In section 4, the effectsof imperfect credibility arc investigated
when consumers cannot substitute towardcurrent consluliptiomi by running a larger currentac-
count deficit.4 In these circumstances, the shadow valueof saving miiust increase to equilibrate the
expected marginal utility of real consumptioli in bothperiods. High real interest rates have in fact
been a common feature ofmany recent liberalization attenij,ts. Here we find that more gradual
speeds of liberalization will help bring down interestrates and shift production toward the export
sector. Finally, section 5 concludes.
1. The Model
We employ a two-period model of a smallcountry simitilar to that of Svensson and Razin (1983),
Razin and Svensson (1982), and Edwards andvan Wijnbergen (1983). There are two goods, exports
(x) and imports (rn),bothof which are consumed and I)roduce(I. The smallcountry is represented
41n a similar two period modcl, Edwards andvan SS'ijnbergen (1983) investigate the optimal speed of liberalization for the case in which a binding external financing constraint,falls entirel on investment, anti secontl.perjoil tariffs arezero with certainty.
3by a single consumer, who maximizes eX1)CCtC(I welfare. TV=TV('y, F), where 'y = y(Cm, c)denotes
subutility in period one of the consiunptioii of imports. rfl,,an(leXpOrts, ca..Periodtwo suhutility
is expressed as I' = r(G,, C).5' andF are assmuned to have the expected utility property and are
homothetic. Without loss of generality,ami I' can be chosen to be linearly homogeneous. Each
period's expected suhutility has an associated imit CXI)eil(litllre function, irafl(l H, which yields the
minimum expenditure required to reach the unit level of expected slml)litility in that period, given
current prices of imports and exports:
lr(pm,, 1)= mm {pm Cm + pc,r : I < 'i( Cm, e) }, (i)
ll(P70, P, 1) = miii {PIUCW + PC., : I < r(c01, C1)).
We can think of w an(1 H as the price of obtaining a single unit. of expected subutility in
that period or as the price of a unit of real spending. 'y. F. Expressions for nominal spending are
therefore iry and [IF, the price index times the measure of real consuinptioii in that. period.
The analogous intertemporal expenditure function, E(w, DH. TV), gives the minimum present
discounted expenditure required to achieve a fixed level of expected welfare, for given levels of the
price indexes, w and H:
E(x, DH, TV) = miii {2r(p.m, pr)' + DH(Pm, 1)F : W < W(, r)}, (ii)
where D =is the discount factor and z is the doniestic nominal interest rate. Overall welfare,
W, is the expected utility of real consumption over 1)0th 1)eriOds.
We will use the well-known properties of the expenditure function that its first derivative with
rcsI)cct to prices yields the Hicksian compensate(I (lelllan(I fuiiction for each gooi (here givenfor
period one goods and imports, respectively):
Ej(7r,DH,T'V) = 'y(7r.DH.W) (iii)
c,,(p,0i'.i ) =
1
Thioughout the paper weuselower case letters for period one vsrial,les ,itluppercise letters for period two variables,
4From the Slutsky equation, the marginalpropensity to spend tinies the change in expenditure with




wherec is the marginal proJ)ensity to spend in J)rriod one nut ofa ('ilange in expenditure.
On the production side we define first- andsecoild-1)erio(l (niliposite revenue functions (over
exports and imports), q and Q,whichare homogeneous of (legr(' one in each period's prices:
q(pThP.TK, L) =max{Pmi+ p.Tq2 :q1. q2 are feasible }, (v)
where the own derivatives withreSI)ect to prices, q =?i(pm Pr:K,L) aiid q2 =q2(p11,, p; K,L)
are the first-period supply fimctions for imports andexports, respectively (and similarly for period
two).
2. Expected Collapse of a LiberalizationProgram when Reserves are not Rationed
With this model in mind we considera country which has just lil)rralize(l its trade account
by elilllinating tariffs on imports. In order to focuson the prnl)lenls LDC's may face during such
liberalizations, we assume that thecniuiti'y is credit constraint'cI iii that the I)rivate sector does
not have direct access to to suppliers offoreign exchange. Instva(I, all l)orrowing in international
capital markets is conducte(I by the government at thebeginning of period one. The initial level of
hard-currency reserves hieki by the goverilnient, 1?, inclu(lesany external financing the government
has been able to arrange, and is treated hereas exogenously determjne(I (though in reality it is the
outcome of a quasi—iiiai'ket bargainingprocess bctw('eli the goveriinjeitt and its creditors).
In these circumstances, the government must flulanceany clitrent ac coinit deficit from its stock
of reserves. (In the next section, we consider thecase in which the goveriinuiif refuses or is unable to
finance the entire current account deficit, andrations foreign exchange instead.) Thegovernment's
reserves are also used to shliel(l the private sector frnmiilllIantici1)at(scl shocks to export revenues or
import expenditures which occur during periodoiie. Thus the ex post current account deficit, or
the total reduction in governmneiitreserves, is the sum of the current accoiuit deficit the private
sector chooses plus a random shockcomponent:
(1)
5whereis distributed normally with mean 0 and Variaiic(' At the end of the first period,
reserves are R —
Tofocus on the possibility that the liberalization program will 1w abandoned, we assume the
government follows a rule—of-thumb policy in deciding whether to impose second—periodtariffs. The
rule is that tariffs will be reimposed at their original pre-liberalizatioii level in period two if reserves
at the end of the first period fall below sonic critical floor, Rmj,,:
R — < I?,,. (2)
Tariffs remain at zero if equation (2) is not satisfied. The prol)al)ility that the liberalization I)i'ogram
will 1)e reversed is just the probability that, equation (2) holds:
=P(I?,,,j,,,z)=proballllity{/l.> R —R,,,,—z). (3)
To keel) matters simple all(I to avoid aml)iguitics, we assume that. II,,, ,,isset equal to the difference
between the initial level of reserves and the itiaximinu currciit account deficit. i.e., the deficit the
private sector would choose if tariffs were to be rcinstate(l with probability one:
z(..\ =1). (4)
Notice that even with a balanced! current account, there is still a nonzero plol)al)ility of reversal
since:
P( Rmiu, o,z) = prol)ahulity{p. > I? — }>0. (5)
The goverment's decision rule imnl)hes that the price of iniports in period two is olistributed
Linomially:
—(p, ifjt < I?— I?,,,,, —
Pm= (6)
p + Ti,,ifp > 1? —R,,1,1—
wherer1, is the tariff which will be ilnl)osc(l if the liberalization program fails. In the following
analysis. we take r, to be given exogenoiisly.
Before we proceed, two other aspects of the model require elalmration. First, in this type
of welfare—based general eqiiilibriuimi model, it is often useful to limit. the absolute niagnitucle of
distortions (in our case, ii,). Large distortions result. ni large reductions in real income, and these
income effects eventually swamp the subtler substitution effects we wish to study. So, for example,
6a small tariff in tile iiitia periodencourages agents to shift. real expencIjftl'(towards the second
period, when the tariff will be reiiioved.As we might expect, thecurrent account in period one
shows a surplus. In anattempt to offset the negative first-pei'jo(Jwelfare effccts of a somewhat
larger temporary tariff, however,agents begin to shift real income backtoward the period of the
distortion. Utimately, when thetariff grows big enough, thea(Iditional borrowing in the first
period is sufficient to swing thecurrent account jut0 (1cfict.Althoughone could question the
importance of such perverse marshalljaneffects on the basis of their doubtfulrealism, we rule
theni out here simply becausetariffs are imposed bygoveruiulieuits with the intention ofimproving
(and not worsening) the cujrreuitaccouuiit We do not wish to considei'po1icic that have effects
systematically Opposite those expected by theauthorities. Therefore, in theSpirit of the small (but
fiuiite) tariff assumption we frequentlyexpress sufficient conditioums for the paper's resultsill terms
of upper bounds on the size of thetariff.
A second aspect of the uiiodel that
requires additional explanat.joui is the treatmentof uncer-
tainty. Random prices are notusually ad(lcd to interteuull)oral generalequiilibriujuij models l)Ccause
of the additional complexitythey bring. The stan(lar(I results fromduality theory (Jo not generally
hold when prices are random. Forexamj)le, there is no guarantee that theuiiatrix of Hicksian sub-
stitution terms is negative semflj(IefilliteIn the present paper, howeverWe are able to invoke a kind
of weak-form certaintyequivalence by exploiting the l)illonhialdistrihutioj of import prices and the
limitations imposed on timemulagnitucle of the tariff by the suuiall tariffassuini1)tioI. The intuition
for this strategy is actuallya simple one. Notice that the itlimoment of the second-period tariff,
can be written as() = (1—t1)•For small tariffs andany given Prol)ahility that the
liberalization will collapse, the higher-ordt.milommients of are insignificantly smuiall relativeto the
expectatiomi, More precisely:
urn (1—")r''=0,Vn > 2.
(7) r—.O
Theeffects of a change in theprolm.bzlzty that tariffs will be leviedin period two can be made
arbitrarily close to the effects ofa known change ill the future tariff.For snialt enough values
of r, the signs of thesul)stituitjofl and income effectsreuulajui the same as in thecertainty case,
even though the optimal choice varial)lesbecome vastly more coiiiplex functionsof the underlying
utility and production functions.Since we make no atteuiiptin the PPer to specify the various
7elasticities of consumption am1 produc finn heyOli(Itheir repsec tive signs, all of the results remain
general enough to apply to a variety of utilityan(l production fiuictions. hideed, such a treatment
of uncertainty seems particularly iiatiiral in this case, since, aswe have alrea(ly noted, it is desirable
to restrict our attention to small valuesof r, even without introducing uncert.aiiit.y. In the first
appendix, we discuss this strategy for dealingwith random future tariffs in more detail. We also
demonstrate how a restriction on the size of r issufficient to guaraittee that. the substitution
effects (i.e. second derivatives of the expenditurefmiction with respect to eX1)ectCd prices) have
the usual signs.
We are now ready to apply the model of the previoussection, and t.o derive the rationally
expected level of credibility, the correspon(Iiligcurrent accoiuit, and the level of welfare under
complete liberalization. The mt,ertemporal budgetconstraint of the country is:
E( ir(pm ,ps),DH( Pm, P )W)=q(pm'Pr)+ DQ (Pm, I) + T. (8)
Equation (8) requires that total expenditure is ((1ual tothe 1)res(m1t (hiscounteci value of income plus
tax revenues. Revenues generated by a future tariffwill 1w rrhlrmle(l to the 1)rivate sector in the
form of a lump sum transfer, T, where
T D(E2fl1 —CJ)= D(C, —CJ) (9)
Cm —Q 1represeiits net imports, or cohisllml)tion minus(lomnestic 1)roduction of the imported gooi,
awl r= 1\r, theexpected future tariff. We assume that the country has no prior debt to the rest
of the world (this could easily be added). Consequently.the cnrreiit a,ccoumt (leficit is eciual to
consumption expenditure minus total revenuesfrom production:
z=E1ir—q. (10)
To see that an imperfectly credible conimnit,iiicnt to free tradeleads to a sumboptimal allocation
of resources, we t.ake the derivative of equation (8) with respect to ,\aud use equatioii (0) to get:
=o(i,\, (11)
where
rD(E2Hjj + 111E22111D —()
(:10= 1 —Dfl1C
8Equation (11) gives the loss in welfare attributableto a Ilolizero 1)rol)al)ility that futuretariffs will
be levied. Welfare declinesproportionally in the i)roi)ability of a policyreversal; indeed, integratjoi1
of equation (11) gives the familiarHarberget• result that the loss in welfare isJ)rOpOrtional to the
qtiare of the distortion (i.e., the lack of 1)CI'fCCtcredibility).
The welfare effects of the Iluisaijocation of resources are slullIljlaIjze(l in.Theulumerator is
proportional to the discoumfecj s1li)stitulfioli
effect in co11s111111)fjoIj andproduction, holding welfare
constant. The first terni in themimerator, E2fl11 = isthe change in the coml)ensatecldemand
for period two imports froma change in price holding real period twoexpeiidituii'e constant. This
captures the Zfltratemporal substitution inconsum1)tioli of exj)nrts for imports. The secondterm,
IIi E H1 D is the change in period two realsi)en(Iing from a change in theJ)rice of
imports, weighted by the share of importsin spending. This terni represents thetransfer of real
income across periods in response toprice changes. The third terni, —Qisthe negative valuation
effect on imports realizedas a result of the (histortioii. Takentogetliei these three termscoml)rise
flue colnl)dnsated siibstjtutjoui effectsof the expected future tariff: allrepresent welfare losses.0
It is worth mentioning the effectson productioii as well. On the margin,olItJ)ut of the imported
good is expected to rise by PQ11whileoutput of exports is ('xperte(l to fall byau equivalent
amount,7 PQ21. The standardiiicchanjsm linking the oultJ)llt ofillIJ)OI't5 aul(l exports is the wage-
rental ratio, w, winch decreaseswith higher importprires. The effect of cxec ted price changes
on the composition of outputcan be seen in Figure 1, the fanuiliar Saiwielsondiagram. With zero
expected future tariffs, the terms of tradestand at m(01r('spondingto an output mix at point B
(where A represents completespecialization in exports and Dlepreseults coiiiplete specialization in
imports), given the capitahlal)oI' ratio of theeconomy, k. An increase in tariffs lowers theexpected
terms of trade to p'. lowers w andmoves the outJ)lit iruix to point C, wheremore imports and fewer
exports are produced than before.
6 The overall eWectofthe expecte,l future tariff on welfare will hei gative provirliiig the staj,jlity coii,litin I — i(]w > 0 is satisfied. An llIlIlecessarjh.
strong hut, sufficjej, conhitioij for this is if flipitiargijial Jropeitsjfv to i'nd in hioth peods is positive, that is, if DflC1 < 1. To see thisnote that
IC,,,P,,,C,,, TDflICIF lDflC <<—_<1 nrj nr nr'
These two term.s canc exactly only forinfinitesimal chialiges in relative prices. For discretechanges, the change in total olitl)flt, is zero only for first, orilrr aI)proxiinatioris
9Figure 1








PrJTo see the effects of a change iii tileprobability of a policy reversal on thecurrent account we






The first term in equation(12), a1, is tile sum of thecolnpellsate(j ifltertempoi.al substitution
effects in cOnsurnptioii; it tendsto increase unambiguously thecurrent account deficit. The intuition
is that higher expected tariffsraise the aggregate level ofI)rices in the second period and lower
the real conslimptioli rate ofinterest, I + r =. Theincentive to save is therefore reduced
and consumption is transferredtoward the first period. Also, thelower the credibility of the
liberalization program, tilegreater the Inisaliocatioji of realresources toward the inefficientimport sector.
The second terni inequation (12), —a2,\, which isnegative, reflects tile decrease in total
income from the distortionweighted by the marginalI)ropensity to spend in period one and the
expected tariff. A decrease in total incomereduces real spending iiievery period,8 which improves
the current account. Notice thatif tile tariff becomes too large, thesecond term will dominate, and
the expected future tariff willimprove the first-period currentaccount. As we mentioned at the
beginning of this section, tile negativeincome effects of large tariffsswamp the substitution effects,
and ultimately result incurrent account balances thatare lint sensible. We thereforeuse as an
uPper bound on the size of tile tariff thepoint, at which tile slIi)stitlltioil effectsare just cancelled out
by tue income effects: 0 <,<.Notethat at the margin =0,the ilitertenhl)ol.al substitution
effects, a1, induce a marginalcurrent account deficit regardless of thesize of ii,.
To find the approximate deviationin the level of the curreiitaccount fi•1 the zero expected
tariff equilibrium, weintegrate equatioii (12) to getan expression which is once againapproximately




Equation (13) is graphed in Figure2. Given our restrietioll on r1,, the currentaccount deficit is an
increasing ftmction of the probabilitythat the liberalization program willfail.'0
We can now solve for the rational expectationsequilibrium of the model by coIlll)iniflg equations
(3) and (13). A linear approximationto A in equatioli (3), is USe(I for the algebraicsolution since
the cmnulative normal (listribution is nottractal)le analytically:"
A V(X,c,z) a + a4z, (14)
where
2 ._______
a3= a3kJ4nin, Os,) < U. >
(-Join (7,
2 a4 = a4(R,0i0, ,i) : —>0. > 0.
8Rmin
Equations (3) and (13) now give equilibriumlevels of credibility, A*. and the current accrnmt deficit,




—ai)+ ((aia4 —j)2+ 2a2a3a4) z= 2
(16)
The scaling restriction in equation (2) is sufficientto imply that a1a4 < 1, a1 > a2, and a3 < 1,
so that A andare both positive. Also, from e(luat.iolls(11) and (13), we have that the loss in
welfare due to the imperfect credibility is:
LW = _.2-A*2 . (17)
2 ET-
The integration performed in equation (13) holdsi and 02 fixed (white in fact they may varywith ), and therefore
jelils an approximation to the current account. The most olwioussiinpiificatin is in the deiioiniitator of on. which may be
written explicitly as a function of ). The term rDfl1 C is equalto the marginal ProPe1y to save times the share of tariff
revenues in total second-period spending, flC0 ,\ winchis small, and thus the deuiuuniitator chaiiges very little for small
tariffs. We could perform the integration in equation (ia)
accounting for this effect. lout the aublitional complication chops not
change of the results, and is omitted here.
'°These results are comparal)le to those of Svensson and Raziti (1083),fl.aziui attil Sveuusson (1082), auid Edwards and van
Wijnbergen (1983) who show, for the case of no uncertainty,that future tariffs tetuul to increase the flrst-1,priod current account
deficit by lowering the real consumption rate of interest.




•0More intuition about the eqiulibrmm caii 1)C gained from a graph than from the algebraic
solution. Figure 3 displays the current account and probability of collapse given in equations (13)
and (5). As one might expect, greater iutert.empOral sul)stitutal)ilit.y in COflsUmI)tiOflraises the
edpulil)rium current account. and I)rol)a)iIity of collapse. From equation (17),the lack of credibility
imposes larger welfare losses when these mtert.emporal transfers are more readilyitiade. An increase
in the world interest rate predictably reduces the current accouiit (leficit (since any given future
surplus finances a smaller current deficit) and lowersami 1T'. Fiiially, increases in uncertainty
about. the future level of reserves (which raise the intercept an(l the slope of the P curve in equation
(14)) yield a higher probability of collapse, a greater current account deficit,and a lower level of
welfare.
2.1. A Second Best Argument for a Slower Rate of Trade Liberalization
The model above can now be use(I to investigate the justificat.ioii for positive first-period tariffs
as a second—best tool for reducing the distortion introduced by a lack of perfect credibility.Such
temporary tariffs may be added to the foregoing analysis by rewritiiig equations (8), (9),and (10)
as follows:
E(ir,DH,W) —_q(p,i,,p)+DQ(Pm,Pz)+t+T (18)
t = rj(Eirrj —q,) (19)
T = D(E2 Hi —Qi)
z=—+Eiir, (20)
where t represents the lump sum transfer of revenues front the first-period tariff. Equation (20) is
similar to (10), the hats indicate that the trade deficit is eValUate(l at interiiational prices instead
of at distorted domestic prices.'2 Differentiating equation (18) and using (19) we have the change






12 This complicates matters since the usualdualityexpressions imist. lie aitiended. For example, ott the production side first.
period production in international prices is, q pqj + q. A change in the tariff alters domestic 1,roduct.ion decisions, but
international prices remain fixed, q = p,,qi I+q21. Tue domestic marginal rate oftrancfnri,tat.ion sat.icfles (p,+ri)qi i+q = 0.


















J =H1E21ri> 0 (22)
=E1ir11+ w1E11r1 — < 0
A=DI1jCTV >0
0 =rrc> 0.
The variable J on the right-hand side of equation (21) captures the intertemporal substitution
effect. Although it arises from the introduction of a new first period tariff, it acts to rai.5e welfare.
Welfare improves because the real consumption rate of interest,(which is "too" low due to the
anticipation of future tariffs), rises with r1. Consumption is theii shifted toward the future and
the current account improves. Though the intertemporal distortion created l)y low credibility is
mitigated by the imposition of r1, there are obvious costs: a new (histortion in the first period is
introduced. The second term in equation (21) captures the reduction iii welfare attributable to the
intratemporal distortions produced by the first-period tariff. This term is 1)1oI)O1tiOflal to r1, so
that, overall, a marginal first-period tariff teiids unambiguously to unprove welfare.
Equation (21) also implies that there is a unique first-period tariff which maximizes welfare.






Figure 4 shows a graph of r(), the welfare maximizing temporary tariff, which is strictly 1)ositive
for all non—zero ). The reason r is increasing in A is that the higher is the probability of failure,
the greater is the distortion in the consumption rate of interest, and the more it is worth the cost of
incurring a second distortion (in the form of a tariff in period one) which will reduce the distortion
in the real consumption rate of interest. For any given level of cre(hi1)ility, the government can raise
welfare by liberalizing more slowly.
13Figure 4
The Optimal Tariff as a Functionof the Probability of Reversal
/\We now turn to the effects of temporary tariffs onthe cnrreiit account deficit. By differentiating













Theterni a0 captures the iutert.Clfll)Oral effects of the first-periodtariff on expenditure and
welfare. The tariff shifts spending toward the second period as thereal consumption rate of interest
rises; a0 will be positive as long as r1 is not toolarge.'3 Tariffs today will therefore offset the
suboptimal reduction in the real consumption rate of interestcaused by 1)OsitiVe eXI)eCted tariffs
tomorrow. The incentive to save increases and the current account.improves.'4
If we evaluate equation (25) at the optimal tariff as defined in equation (23),it can be shown
that the current account improves for all r1 < r1. From this fact, itfollows that the level of the
temporary tariff which maximises the current account,call it. j,isgreater thaii the level of the
optimal temporary tariff, r1. This imiakes sense intuitivelybecause for r1 expenditure is
transferred on the margin toward the first period. Welfare imist alrea(Iy 1)e di'clining.
The approximate iniprovemdnt in the current account. (leficit froni positivefirst period tariffs
can be obtamed by integrating eqiiatioii (25) over r1:
z(rj) =—a0rj
—a7r. (27)
51\tore explicitly, o will be positive as long as:
T1 e, 2rc —+—<1. -nr
where 4" is the share of tariff revenue in first period spending and !'!isthe expecteil share of tariff revenue in second
period.s)ending. A sufficient condition for this equatioii to hold is for tariff revenues to be lessthan 50 I)ercetit of nominal
spending in each period.
14 The second parameter, c*, is less important for smaller r1. This term reflects changes iii current consurnptioii and
production due to the temporary tariff. The sign of 4*7 is ambiguous, bt will lie positive as long asthe interteinporal
substitution effects are "large" in comparison with the first, prio4l ijitrateinporal substitiitioii effects. To make this l)rise, (*7
willhe positive if:
rEi11r1> (1—xrn')(qi i — Er1 i)
14It is convenient to define a function which allowsus to see howchangesin first-period tariffs
affect the current account as ) varies:
=z(1\) +zz(r1) (27')
= — a2\ — a6r1 —
Figure5 demonstrates the effect on thecurrent account of first-period tariffs (equation(27')).
An increase in the probability that theliberalization i)rogralll will collapse, from.to.,worsens
the tradeoff between current account deficitsand first-period tariffis. shifting thez curve out and to
the right.15 Figure 6 shows how the tradeoffbetween current accoinit deficits anda lack of perfect
credibility improves with the a(Iclition of sinaI!temporary tariffs. lii z-, -space, the z curve shifts
down when first-period tariffsare imposed.
We now have three equations in three unknowns:the current account deficit,z, the probability
of collapse of the liberalizationprogram, ), and the oI)tuhlal tvnLporary tariff, r:
z(ri, .) = a1\ — — —
(28)
rA)=a..\ (20)
= P(Rmin,ii,z) = a3 + 4Z. (30)
Figure 7 characterizes the welfare maximizing solution.In the upper right-hand quadrantare
the P (equation (30)) and z (equation(28)) curves. They intersect initially at the instantaneous
liberalizatioii equilibrium, point A. In thelower—right quadrant is a 45 degree line,mapping \ into
itself. The third quadrant contains thercurve(equation (20)), which translates a given level
of credibility into an impliedoptimal first-period tariff. Finally. in theupper left is the z curve
in z-, ri-space (equation (28)), whichreports the curiejit account, deficit associated with different
first-period tariffs, given values of )generated by intersections of the P and zcurves in the first
quadrant.
For simplicity this curve is drawnas downward sloping. At levels of r ahov(' the olt.iinaltariff,however,07 l)CCOIflCS negative and the z curve, drawn inz, r1 space, begins to slope upward.
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The Change in the Current Account froma Shift in First—Period Tariffs
as a Function of the ProbabilitY of ReversalFigure 7
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zConsider now what happens if the liberalizationproceeds iiiore slowly. Positive tariffs in period
one shift the z curve in the firt quadrant down. This definesa new intersection of the P and z
curves at a lower current account deFicit and lower ,markedl)y J)oint B. Moving in a clockwise
direction into the third quadrant, the rcurvegives the optimal temporary tariff. In theupper left
quadrant, the value of the optimal tariff is translated intoa corresl)onding current accoirnt deficit.
If the deficit is the same as that generatedby the intersection of the z and Pcurves, we have
found the fixed point B. If it is not, wetry a higher (or lower) r,shiftingthe z curve further down
(or up). The fixed-point values, r1,z, givethe optimal speed of liberalization, theoptimal
current accoimt deficit, and the resulting degree ofcredibility, given the underlying parameters R,
It is straightforward to show that 0 < z<z,0< ,\** < , and 0 < rr.A
liberalization program which removes tariffsdirectly and has less than perfect credibilitycan be
improved upon by slowing the speed at which tariffsarc reduced.
It is also possible to do some comparative staticswith this model, An increase in the level
of reserves, will raise Rmj,andlower z,.A,rrasshown in Figure 8. Here the P curve shifts
left (its slope decreases as well) anti thez curve in z-,r1-spaceshifts down, since the improvement
in credibility implies that atany given level of r1,thecurreiit account deficit will be lower. The
initial optimum is given by A, r1andzandthe new optimum byr andz*.Greater
international liquidity, evidenced by a lower level of will have the same qualitative effect on
the equilibrium: the P curve shifts to the leftas the program's susceptibility to trade balance shocks
improves. The higher the level ofreserves, and the easier it is to negotiate additional international
lending, the greater the optimal speed of liberalization. Anincrease in the variance of unexpected
shocks to reserves, , shifts the Pcurve in a differeiit maimer, shown in Figure 9. The result is
that z,A,r1allincrease: the optimal rate liberalization iseven slower.
It is worth stressing that onaverage imiore resources are devoted to exj)orts in period two
when the liberalization proceeds gradually thaiiwhmemi the liberalization is immediate. In terms of
Figure 1, temporary tariffs cause a smaller decrease iii theexpected relative p11cc of exports and
wage/rental ratio, so that the shift in resources towardimports is less pronounced. This reallocation
of resources is important sinceone uiotivation for undertaking a liberalizatiomiprogram in the first
t6BCcaUSe the algebraic solutions for ,,andrarernml"'rsome aiiilyi'hlno athIif.ijjal insights, theyareomitted here,
16Figure 8
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I
Iplace is to boost the allocation ci rrsonrces in exportsectors.
3. Expected Collapse of a Liberalization Programwhen Reserves are Rationed
The previous section explored the kind of difficulties whicli confront aless than fully credible
removal of tariffs when domestic reserves are made available to fiuiaiicethe private sector's current
account deficit. Frequently, however, reserves are rationed bythe government, so that additional
borrowing by the private sector is not I)OSSil)le. In this section welook at the effects of an incredible
liberalization when the current account is fixed by the authorities. The privatesector's excess
demand for loans in the initial I)eriod is vitiated1 iii the lIio(Iel 1)elow by arise in the domestic
interest rate, which compensates individuals who would otherwise want to consume morein the




where D* = andi is the nominal world rate of interest. In equation (31), we treat the higher
domestic interest rate as a tax on first period borrowing. The term (D* —D)(Q
—E2H)represents
the redistribution of the revenues fromim the tax. We assume that. these taxes are calculatedin terms
of real goods, evaluated at period-two domestic p'5• The cimiTelit accoiuit constraint is given by
2 =D*(Q
—E211), (33)
where the hats indicate that the current account is fixed in terimis of international currency. To see
how the domestic discount rate varies in respomise to positive expecte(1 future tariffs we differentiate
equations (31) and (32) using (33):
(1 + (D* —D)N
—Da,\(D* —D)F
—?(DB+ V)'\ (EwdW
N—aA F — ) dD (4)
((_(D* —D)(V+ G) + DC)r
('C—G)i F
where
a =rfliCn'> 0 (35)
17B=fl1E22H<0
C H1E22FID + E2H11 —Q11 <0
F=rIE22rI<o
C = flE22ITD <0
N=llCTT.>o
V=E2HI_QI>0
Applying Cramer's rule to equation (34),some algebra yields the solutions:
EwdW = —rfl)(D—D*)v+ ?(D* 2D)(CB —FC)+ V(C — (36)
dD = (c(1 —(2D—D*)N)—G(1—Da)—(D*— — (a—N)(D*—
D)V)d.(37)
The determinant of the matrixon the left-hand side of (34), ,isnegative as shown in Appendix 2.
Appendix 3 gives gives explicit limitsOn the size of r4, to guarantee that EV< 0 in equation (36).
It is easy to be convincedon an intuitive level that welfare should fall.As individuals' expectations
of future tariffs increase, theexpected distortion rises and so welfare is reduced.This seemingly
obvious result is complicated in theabove equation because the domesticinterest rate is free to
fluctuate in response topressure on the current account, and will1)resumably do so in a way that
tends to raise welfare al)ove what itwould have been if it were fixed.
Equation (37) gives theresponse of the interest rate to changes inexpected future tariffs.
The lack of perfect credibility lowerstime consumption rate of interest andencourages consumption,
causing the current account constraint to bind
more severely. Consequelitly, interest ratesmust rise
in order to compensate individualsfor the iltimediate consumptionthey otherwise would desire.17
Figure 10 demonstrates this mechanismusing the P and z curves from theprevious section.
Now, however time ex ante currentaccount is pegged at Z. At point B timecurrent account Constraint
If the expected tariff becomes too large,however, thou once again the luegative welfare effectsswamp the results: desired first-period consumption falls, the current accountconstraint becomes less binding. ais.l the iuuterest,rate fails. Equation (37) is therefore negative and interest rates rise with \if











Iis just binding, so that, V =D'and, from equation (11),-.Theequilibrium, ,\ (point
C), has associated with it a domestic interestrate which exceeds the world rate (pointD). Althoigh
it is not tractable analytically, it is inprinciple possible to integrate (37) from-toto get
the domestic interest differential, D—
L(2,)f dD(A)d. (38)
aL(Z,) 9L(z,\) From equation (37),—a-——<0 and———->0. Figure 10 also shows the effecton the domestic
interest rate of a change in theborrowing constraint from 2 to 2'. Whieji thecurrent accoimt fixed
at 2', interest rates begin to rise at point E'instead of point E. At a given level ofcredibility, the
equilibriuni domestic interest rate is falls wlieii thecapital constraint is loosened: point D' implies
a lower interest rate than D, Welfare improves
unambiguously.
3.1.ASlower Rate of Liberalization whenReserves are Rationed
Now we can proceed to analyze theoptimal speed of liberihiz,atioii whenreserves are rationed.
The budget constraint is similar toequation (31):
E(w, DH, W) =q+ DQ + t + T + (D —D)(QE211) (39)
T =DI(E2H1—Qi (40)
t = r1(Eir1— q1),
(41)
with t representing first-period tariffrevenues. The current account is given by equation(33):
2= D*( -E2ñ), (42)
Taking the derivative of equations (39) and(42), and using equations (40) and (41)we have:
I1+(D*_D)N_Da —o(D—D)F_r(V+Dfl)_r1H\(E11rdW 43 N—(z\ F—ill )k(ID
(D,J + en —(D—D)Hd =Jff
where
19a =rHiGi> 0 (44)
0 =r1nc> 0
B=fl1E2211<0
=Er11+ w1E1jir1 —q11< 0





















—B)+ H(J —H))> 0. (49)
The optimal tariff is once agaili increasing and approxiinat.'ly liiicar iii : wheii credibility is
low, more can be gained from instituting larger first-pcriod tariffs.'8
ln equation (48), jO appears to have an ambiguous sign. A simple coIit.intity argument serves to show that it must be
positive. The fact that 1e, is greater than zero implies that the change in welfare from a first period tariff, evaluated when rj
iszero, is unambiguously positive. As long as the first, (lerivative of welfare is coxitinitoils, snisli increases in the level of r1will
raise the level of welfare. Thus, at least for small first. period tariffs, °iOipositiVi'.
20Next we consider the behavior of iiiteretrates when tariffs are imposed in the initialperiod.
From equation (46) we have:




a12 = — H)(iE2111i.—C11r) >0.
Equation (50) implies that interest rates willfall as a result of highertemporary tariffs provided
that r1 < u. A simple intuitiveargument serves to denionstrite that the domesticinterest rate
remains above the world rate at theoptimal tariff, r. The only benefit toraising r1 comes from a
decline in the interest rate (isfixed). The cost of such a policy is thetemporary distortion that
tariffs induce. At the point wherer1 =ll,the benefits of raising tariffs furtherare zero, but the
costs of the added distortionare positive. It follows that welfarecan be at a maximum only when
the benefits are still positive, i.e.that T1 < Ji-.
From equation (50) we canintegrate over r1 to obtain:
L(2, ,r1)L(, )— a11T1+ a12r, (52)
which gives the level of the interestrate for given values of ,r1,and 2.
We can now solve for theoptimal first-period tariff and theequilibrium level of credibility and
domestic interest rate. Thereare three equations and three unknowns:
= 2) =a3+ a4Z (53)
=
(54) a10
L(Z, ,r1)=DD(Z, ) — a11r1+ a12m- .
(55)
The solution is displayed inFigure 11. Note thatis detcrxiiiiiecj by 2 andequation (53), so
that the above system isrecursive. Given ), equation (54)yields the o1)timal tariff, rj. Equation
21Figure 11 F
L
ji!(55) then gives the equilibrium domestic interestrate, i. When flit' current account is fixed by
government fiat and domestic interest rates are consequently driven aboveworld rates, gradual
liberalization appears to be the optimal policy in the faceof imperfect credibility.
In many cases, a reduction in the speed of liberalizationwill ease pressure on the current
account constraint, and in some cases the constraint willno longer bind. If this occurs, we are in
the situation described in section 2, and thetendency for tciiipoiary tariffs to improve welfare and
the efficiency of resource allocation isstrengthened over and above the argumeiits presented in this
section, since first-period tariffs purchase both reductions iii thedoiiiestic interest rate as well as
improvements in credibility.
224. Conclusions
When the private sector can obtain hard currency to huiaiicc its desired currentaccount deficit,
an imperfectly credible and immediate attempt toliberalize trade results in a positive current
account deficit and rational positive probability that the liberalizationwill ultimately fail. Positive
expected future tariffs tend to increase future production opportuiiitiesin the import sector relative
to the export sector. The imperfect credibility built into ourimiodel thus tends to undermine one
important motivation for removing tariffs to 1)egin with: toshift 1roductive resources out of the
protected import sector and into the efficient export sector.
A slower rate of trade liberalization can increase welfare over the equilibriumin (1), as long
as the temporary first-period tariffs are not too large.This equilibrium dominates that of the
instantaneous liberalization in that the current account deficit is smaller, z<z,theprobability
of the program's failure is lower,< ), and welfare is greater. There is a unique (positive)
first-period tariff which maximizes intertemporal welfare. Second period 1)rOduCtioflin the import
sector is on average lower with such temporary tariffs. Thus, a mimore gradual S1)Ced ofliberalization
may actually help encourage a shift of resources fromthe import sector into the export sector.
For the case in which the current account is collstraine(l by rationing of reserves, imperfect
credibility translates into domestic interest rates that are above those in the restof the world.
We show that in such circumstances, an immediate and comI)lete tariff reduction is inferior to a
more gradual approach. When such temporary tariffs are imposed, the domestic,interest rate is
lower than it would be under instantaneous liberalization (but it remains aboVe the world rate).
Time behavior of the interest rate in this instance indicates that it. is particularly problematic for
countries with foreign exchange constraints to liberalize successfully. When high interest rates force
down the capital stock in the export sector, it becomes all time niore difficult to obtain fresh loans.
Thus, in the common case in which a current account constraint is a coiiseiuciicc of a low level of
reserves and too little international liquidity, an incre(Iible Iil)erali/,atiOli I)10gra111 iiiay usiifurther
into the future the day whemi voluntary lending and borrowing call be reSlUfle(1.
235. Appendix 1
In this appendix we investigate fnrther thetreatment of uncertainty used in the text.Our
basic problem is to determine thecomparative statics of the model discussed in sectiontwo when
A, the probability that the liberalizationprogram will fail, changes. Because the Consumption
and production problems forour sinai! country are formally identical, we need to lookat a single
example only. Here we investigate the maximizationof period two subutility:
max {r(C.m, C,.) : P,0 C,,, + (y= y}, (A1.1)
where g is second-period real income,which is taken as fixed by theconsumer. By substituting in
the budget constraint, we can rewrite(A1.1) as
max (r (C,,,,— ,, C,) }. (Al.2)
The first order condition is:
E[r1}E[r21',,,] , (A1.3)
where Fm =E[J=p,,+ Am-n. To find expected utility, we takeTaylor series expalisions around
F,,,:
E[r1 —r22C,,,(1,,, — i)+ r122(i,,, —t)2c,,] (A1.4)
E[,r21 E[PmP2 + (F,J22Cm+ —Fm)+ (r222c, —2r22C111)(,,,—P2]
where the bars indicate thatutility is evaluated at the expected price level.19By taking expecta-
tions, (A1.4) becomes
E[r1j =r1+ r122(Tc, (A1.5)
E[P70r2Jp,,,r2 + P,0r222a2c, 2r22c
Substituting (A1.5) into (A1,3) gives the first ordercondition expressed in terms of the firsttwo
moments of Pm:
Fm + =(F2+ r222a2c.,)pm(7,,,2F22 . (A1.6)
'For simplicity, we limit this demo,istratjo,,to second order expansions. Providing that thehigher order de%tives of t exist, longer expansions still satisfy proposition A.!below.
24To find the pure substitution effect, wetake the total derivative of equation (Al.6) with
respect to A. The resulting expressioncontains derivatives of expected utility, and income and
substitution effects. To eliminate the income effects, we a1)prOXilflat.ethe level of eXI)eCted utility
by a Taylor series expansion,
E[F1 F + 2cr2, (Al.7)
and take the derivative of (A1.7) with respect to Afor a givell level of expected utility. Combining
the derivatives of equations (Al.6) and (Al.7) yieldsthe pure SU1)StitlltiOfl effect:
=(F11
—2PF21 + m i'22)(P2 + , (AL8)
where the first term on the right-hand side is the certainty equivalent substitution effect, and 'P is
0(0) in r:
=4A(1 — A)C(F1221 — 2PFj222 + PP2222) + A(l —A)h1j(2Cm(l'122
—'3m222)+F22)
—A(1— A)c, P222+ (1— 2A)(C,(F122—P,F222) + c7P22)
—(I
—2A)(cr22)(r12
—PmF22+ '2c2 (F1222 —P,,,r2222)+ a2CF222)
"2 + l2c2 P222
The sign and magnitude of 'P will depend upon the specific utilityfunction chosen. Notice that,
by continuing the Taylor series expansions in equations (Al.4)and (Al.7) out i)CyOlld the second
order, 'P would remain 0(0) in r. We then have:
Proposition Al. If < 0, then a necessary and sufficient condition for the ownsub-
stitution effect to be negative is that< —P2W. If 'P_i ￿ 0, then no restriction on r, is
required.
Proof. Note by inspection that if 'P ￿ 0, then the usual convexity assumptionsimply that
equation (Al.8) is negative. If, on the other hand. 'I' < 0,the restriction in Proposition Al is
necessary and sufficient.
256. Appendix 2
Here we outline the conditions required to show thatthe determinant on the right-hand
side of (34), is negative. From equation (34) aftercollecting terms we have that
(A2.1)










which is unambiguously negative. The secondterni inis unambiguously positive, so that we




to ensure thatis negative.
267. Appendix 3
Here we give sufficient conditions that equation (36) is negative. First we demonstratethat the
second term, which appears to be ambiguous in sign, i" since FC —BG> 0. Substituting
from the definitions in (35) we have
(11E22n)(111E22111D + E21111 —Qii)> (fl1E22H)(DflE22H1D). (A3.1)
Some algebra gives us an expression with only positive ternis:
11E22flE21111 + 11E2211Q11 > 0, (A3.2)
The last term in equation (36), V(C —C),is also ambiguous in sigh. Once again a sufficient
condition may be obtained to ensure that rV(?G —C)is positive by restrictil1g the size of the tariff:
11E2211 0<r < (A3.3)
H1E22HD + E21111 —Qi
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